|
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE INDIAN AND PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TESTS
ON THE MIDDLE EAST
Gerald M. Steinberg
Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints
Published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs No. 386
15 July 1998
1) The Shattered Nuclear Equilibrium
Since the beginning of the atomic age in 1945, the possession and
deployment of nuclear weapons has become the dominant factor in the international system.
Those countries that acquired nuclear weapons have become (or maintained their status as)
primary world powers, but as the number of such countries grew, the potential for the use
of nuclear weapons also increased. In the early 1960s, President Kennedy warned that
unless immediate and significant action was taken, within a decade, there would be at as
many as 20 nuclear powers. The process of proliferation was seen as one of the most
dangerous and destabilizing aspects of the nuclear era.
In response to these concerns, beginning in the early 1960s, the United
States led an international effort to slow or block the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
In a broad sense, these efforts were quite successful.
For over three decades, the distinction between the five recognized
nuclear powers and the rest of the non-nuclear weapons states has been a stable feature of
the international system. In 1964, China became the last of the permanent five members of
the UN Security Council to explode an atomic weapon (although at the time, Taiwan occupied
the Chinese seat). While India detonated a nuclear "test device" in 1974, this
was billed as a peaceful nuclear explosive, and was too large and unwieldy to be used as a
deliverable weapon. As a result, it was possible to maintain the claim that India was
merely a threshold state, and not a full-fledged nuclear power
In 1968, negotiations were completed on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and in 1970, this unique global agreement went into force. The NPT, combined with
a network of expanding supplier agreements to prevent the export of technology useful in
making nuclear weapons, created obstacles that clearly slowed the expansion of the nuclear
club. A number of potential members, including Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, and Taiwan
were dissuaded from pursuing this path, and although South Africa clandestinely produced a
small number of nuclear weapons, in the early 1990s, these were dismantled and this
country also signed the NPT as a non-nuclear state.
Israel, India and Pakistan, rejected pressures to sign the NPT and
place its nuclear programs under the safeguards system operated by the International
Atomic Energy Agency. For these three states, the maintenance of an undeclared, or, in the
case of Israel, ambiguous nuclear option was seen as necessary for deterrence and national
strategy. While India, Israel, and (from the mid-1980s) Pakistan were assumed to have the
capability to develop nuclear weapons, the ambiguous nature of this capability and the
absence of testing or public declarations allowed the NPT regime, and the division between
the 5 nuclear weapons states and all of the other non-nuclear states, to remain stable. In
1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely and unanimously, and India, Pakistan and Israel
rejected the pressures that they adhere to the treaty. This process confirmed the status
of these states as a separate and exceptional group in terms of the NPT.
The major threat to the regime came from a small group of rogue states
that sought to exploit the weakness of the NPT safeguards and verification system by
signing the Treaty but not relinquishing their nuclear ambitions.
Iraq and North Korean provided the clearest examples of this path. The 1991 Gulf War froze
the Iraqi program (probably less than one year before a weapon would have been completed),
and the threat of military action forced North Korea to also halt its program. More
recently, Iran has sought to follow a similar path, in defiance of efforts to tighten
safeguards.
As a result, and despite the persistent efforts of these rogue states,
the distribution of nuclear capabilities in the world was relatively stable, with no
additional members joining the nuclear club. Following the end of the Cold War and
collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of nuclear weapons deployed by the two major
powers began to decrease rapidly, to half the levels at the beginning of the 1980s. Recent
agreements are accelerating this process, and tens of thousands of weapons are being
dismantled.
In addition, the negotiation of a complete ban on all forms of nuclear
testing as prescribed in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was designed to
reinforce the stability of the nuclear map. By agreeing to stop testing, signatories
signaled a stronger commitment to preventing the addition of new nuclear powers or the
expansion of existing arsenals.
Critics noted that with supercomputers and simulations, physical testing was unnecessary
for weapons design, but at a minimum, the CTBT was seen as a symbolic and political
barrier to proliferation.
The nuclear stability strengthened the status, and furthered the
interests of the major powers, most notably the U.S. This situation was also was
beneficial to Israel, (as will be discussed in greater detail below), since it allowed
Israel to maintain its ambiguous nuclear capability as a deterrent of last resort, in
response to threats to national survival, but dissuaded many would-be nuclear powers in
the region from pursuing this option. Over the years, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Algeria, and
other states that initially showed signs of seeking nuclear weapons found the obstacles
too difficult to overcome. Ultimately, although at a very late hour, Iraq was also stopped
from developing nuclear weapons, and Iranians are kept under close scrutiny. In 1997,
Israel signed the CTBT, and was considering the pros and cons of ratification of this
treaty. (India and Pakistan rejected the CTBT, and on this issue, as will as discussed in
detail below, Israeli policies diverged from the other two NPT holdouts.)
All of this suddenly changed on May 11 1998, when India announced the
successful detonation of three advanced nuclear devices, followed by two more a few days
later. In contrast to the single "peaceful explosion" of 1974, these were
clearly part of a weapons program, including a boosted or thermonuclear device. Pakistan
followed with its own nuclear tests (six or seven according to Pakistani claims, but more
likely not more than two based on the analysis of the technical evidence.)
The result was that India and Pakistan moved from nuclear threshold
states with ambiguous or unacknowledged weapons capabilities to become de facto nuclear
powers. The number of nuclear powers changed from 5 to 7, and the nuclear equilibrium that
had lasted since 1964 was shattered. As a result, the nuclear non-proliferation regime is
faced with its most significant challenge since it was created, and the impacts on other
regions, including the Middle East, and on Israel in particular, are potentially very
significant.
2) Are Iran and Iraq next?
The efforts of a number of nations in the Middle East to acquire
nuclear weapons began long before the Indian and Pakistani tests, and the immediate impact
of these events in the short term is limited. However, in the longer term, the indirect
results may be very significant.
The critical question is whether the fallout from the Indian and
Pakistani tests nuclear tests will accelerate the rate at which Iran and other countries
in the Middle East are able to acquire nuclear weapons. Different scenarios exist,
depending on future developments. Some analysts argue that the entry of Indian and
Pakistani into the nuclear club will set a new standard for measuring power and
international prestige, and that states that had settled for chemical or nuclear weapons
"as the poor man's nuclear weapon" would now seek to upgrade to nuclear powers.
However, to the degree that the Indian and Pakistani programs are exceptional (India
acquired its nuclear technology from Canada and the U.S. before the NPT regime was
established, and Pakistan received extensive assistance from China), efforts to emulate
them by Iran or Syria might face significant obstacles, in comparison to the Indian or
Pakistani efforts. 1
In a broader sense, if the Indian and Pakistani tests contribute to a
general sense that "the dam restraining the flood of nuclear proliferation" has
been breached, nuclear supplier states that have been relatively stringent in enforcing
export limitations might relax or even end these limitations. If there is a sense of
hopelessness regarding the ability to slow the spread of nuclear weapons, and the
commercial interests that are constantly seeking relaxation of export limitations will
prevail. If this process takes hold in the U.S., the prospects for the continuation of the
non-proliferation regime will be very bleak.
In the more optimistic scenario, the South Asian "shocks"
will press Russia and China into ending the flow of nuclear and missile technology to
Iran.
These two countries have been the primary sources of the Iranian effort
to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and have ignored the impact of a nuclear Iran on
world stability and for their own strategic interests. In July 1998, Iran conducted the
first flight test of the Shihab 3 missile, which will be able to target Israel, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia and much of Russia.
Perhaps now, the prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons, followed by a
chain reaction throughout the Middle East, has become more realistic, and this might lead
to reevaluation of the wisdom of allowing such technology to flow to Iran. (The first
possible steps in this direction were taken in July 1998 when the Russian government
announced that criminal investigations of a number of "enterprises" involved in
the export of technologies prohibited under the Russian export control regulations.2
However, this announcement coincided with the projected imposition of
American sanctions on the Russian firms. Thus, there is reason to treat the long-term
effectiveness of the Russian action with some skepticism.)
Similarly, after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, the countries that have advocated
easing of sanctions on Iraq (primarily Russia, China and France) might now recognize that
as soon as the UN inspectors leave Iraq, Saddam Hussein will resume his effort to acquire
nuclear weapons. Despite the inspections and activities of UNSCOM (the UN Special
Commission investigating Iraqi weapons of mass destruction) that began in 1991, Iraq has
been able to maintain its nuclear design teams. Now, the countries that advocated an
easing of pressure on Iraq might reconsider the implications, particularly with respect
the Iraqi nuclear effort.
But this is the optimistic scenario, and the pessimists are usually
more accurate in their predictions. The pessimistic view is that the Russian and Chinese
assistance to Iran and Syria will continue, and that these countries will seek to
accelerate their nuclear and missile development programs.
This could trigger the renewal of the dormant Egyptian nuclear program, and in a period of
ten years or less, most of the major states in the Middle East will have nuclear weapons.
The Middle East has enough sources of instability, and will not benefit
from any acceleration of the proliferation process to the revolutionary and rogue states
in the region. If the Indian tests are seen as a warning and lead to serious and
uncompromising policies to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to Iran, Iraq, and
Syria, the worst scenarios may be averted. However, in this as in other areas, there is
little evidence for optimism.
3) An "Islamic Bomb"?
After India went ahead with its tests, it became apparent that Pakistan
would soon follow. Since the mid-1980s, many military and security analysts reached the
conclusion that Pakistan had the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. As a result, the
Pakistani decision to emulate the Indians and test their own nuclear weapons was not
surprising.
However, these events led to a series of headlines in the Israeli press
warning of the dangers of an "Islamic bomb". Iranian Foreign Minister Kaman
Charade's visit to Islamabad, a few days after Pakistan joined the nuclear club, seemed to
emphasize these threats. In an interview with the BBC, Charade declared that "From
all over the world, Muslims are happy that Pakistan has this capability...Now they feel
more confident because it will help balance Israel's nuclear capability."3 Similarly,
Hamas leader Sheik AHED Eosin declared that "Pakistan's possession of nuclear power
is to be considered an asset to the Arab and Muslim nations."4 The implication of
this term is that as an Islamic state, Pakistan would now make its nuclear weapons
available in conflicts against Israel. Others argued that these tests would ease the way
for other countries, such as Iran, Libya or Saudi Arabia to develop their own nuclear
weapons.
The term "Islamic bomb", was coined in the late 1970s, after
President Ail Bhutan declared that despite sanctions, Pakistan would follow India in
developing nuclear weapons, even if his people "had to eat grass". Pakistan
received aid from a number of countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and
Libya, leading to concerns that Pakistani nuclear know-how or even weapons would be
transferred to Colonel Ghaddafi, the Saudis, or Saddam Hussein.5 In a broad sense, the
concept of an "Islamic bomb" resulted from "the fear that Muslim solidarity
will lead to, in times of crisis, the transfer of nuclear arms from nuclear to non-nuclear
Muslim countries."6 In the intervening 20 years, there was no sign of an
"Islamic bomb" in this sense. Although Pakistan is believed to have had a
nuclear weapons capability since the mid-1980s, no evidence has surfaced of aid or
technology transfer. With the recent tests, Pakistan became unambiguous nuclear power, but
this does not necessarily imply that Pakistan will now become a source of nuclear weapons
or technology.
Indeed, it is clear that these tests were a response to India's tests,
and that Pakistan is focused on what it perceives as the Indian threat and the conflict
over Kashmir, and has no interest in becoming embroiled in the Middle East. Pakistan's
Minister of Information, Mushahid Hussain, asked "Why do people talk about an Islamic
bomb?...This is a Pakistani bomb. In the case of India, you don't talk of a vegetarian
bomb." 7 This may change if Pakistan needs allies and financial assistance to keep
pace with India, but it is a long-term concern.
Furthermore, far from being an Islamic bomb, the Pakistanis owe this
dubious achievement primarily to the assistance received from China. If anything, this
weapon should be labeled as a "Chinese bomb". Nevertheless, in the first days
following the Pakistani tests, the Arab world and the Palestinians, in particular,
celebrated what they viewed as the birth of the "Islamic bomb". At the Al Aqsa
Mosque, worshipers were ecstatic when Sheik Hayyan Idrisi declared that "the
Pakistani nuclear bomb is the beginning of the resurgence of Islamic power.'' Newspapers
printed cartoons featuring a nuclear mushroom cloud topped by an Islamic crescent, and
some argued that the display of Islamic power would force Israel to make more concessions
in negotiations with Arafat. During the long delay in implementing what the Palestinians
saw as the imminent Israeli withdrawal and the creation of a Palestinian state, some
Palestinians see an "Islamic bomb" as a boost to their own bargaining power, in
some psychological or political sense.
This strategy plays on Israeli concerns regarding technology transfer
from Pakistan to Iran or Iraq, as well as hope that an Iranian nuclear weapon and a change
in the regional balance of power would somehow force Israel to make more concessions
involving security risks in the negotiations with the Palestinians. (In fact, to the
degree that there is an impact, the opposite is the case, and to the extent that Israel is
concerned about security threats from other directions, it will be less likely to turn
over territory to the Palestinians, but this is outside of the issues in this analysis.)
In any case, within a few days, this euphoria disappeared, as the Palestinians understood
that there is no link between the South Asian tests and the Middle East.
In the past, Iran and Pakistan have had some military links in the past
decade, (and a former Pakistani Chief of Staff advocated nuclear cooperation with Iran,
for which he was reprimanded). These links included naval training exercises, and there
are reports of limited weapons exports.
However, experts note that "Recently, relations between Pakistan
and Iran have become strained" as a result of ethnic and religious tensions,
including differences over the Pakistani support for the Taliban in Afghanistan.8 As one
Pakistani analyst has noted, "nothing in the history of Pakistan has shown a
substantial commitment to an Islamic cause. ...Nuclear cooperation with Iran ... would be
further inhibited by the long-standing Shia-Sunni hostility." 9 In addition, Pakistan
is unlikely to risk its close relationship with Saudi Arabia by helping Iran go nuclear.
Another potential source of concern is the possibility of Pakistani
nuclear aid for Saudi Arabia. These two states have intense military links, Pakistanis
provide training and expertise for the Saudi armed forces, and the two states have
cooperated in Afghanistan. Although there have been some unsubstantiated claims regarding
Saudi nuclear ambitions, and given the high degree of Saudi dependence on the United
States, this seems far fetched. 10 In any case, both Iran and Iraq were
well on the road towards nuclear weapons long before Pakistan joined the nuclear club.
Both countries have been receiving nuclear and missile technology from China and Russia.
Thus, even if it was so inclined, the ability of Pakistan to assist Iran or Iraq beyond
what has been received directly from Moscow and Beijing is probably minimal. At most,
Pakistan might become a "second tier" provider, but this is only of importance
for assistance that cannot be obtained from a "first tier" source. (Perhaps some
information on bomb design, based on the recent tests, can be provided, but over 50 years
after Hiroshima, this is of marginal importance.)
4) Israel and India: Less than meets the eye
Immediately after the Indian nuclear tests, a number of attempts were
made to link these actions to Israel. Rumors and reports linked Israel to the Indian
tests, citing accounts of close and increasing military cooperation between India and
Israel. For example, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Gohel Oyav Han, is reported to have
claimed that "In the nuclear tests which India conducted on the 11th and 13th last
month, Israel supplied India with the devices for undertaking simultaneous tests, at an
interval of a thousandth of a second. Only America and Israel have this apparatus, and we
know that it came from Israel."11 In addition, the Pakistani
government claimed that Israeli F-16s were preparing to attack their nuclear facilities,
triggering intense diplomatic activity and even direct conversations between Israeli and
Pakistani diplomats (in itself, a good exercise). There is no
evidence for any of these claims; all aspects of Israeli nuclear program are highly
classified and any reports of cooperation with a foreign country are simply not credible.
It is unimaginable that Israel would take the risks of exposure by even discussing such
issues with foreign officials. Indeed, the reports regarding military cooperation between
New Delhi and Jerusalem are exaggerated. For most of the past 50 years, India's relations
with Israel were minimal, reflecting the important that India attached to the non-aligned
movement and the role of the Arab states in that context.
Although some small arms and spare parts might have been sold by Israel earlier, full
diplomatic relations were only established in 1992, and since then, the military links and
arms sales have been growing slowly.
As P. R. Kumaraswamy notes, there are a number of potential areas for
cooperation12, but most such projects (including Israeli assistance in the upgrading of
India MiG aircraft and Soviet-era main battle tanks) are still in the early stages of
discussion. Indeed, it can be argued that Israel remains disappointed at the slow
development of Indian cooperation, particularly as compared to the level of Chinese
purchases of Israeli systems and technology.
If the sources of the reports and rumors regarding Israeli-Indian
cooperation are examined, there are a number of parties that have an interest in spreading
false information regarding allegations of Israeli involvement. First, by attempting to
link Israel to the Indian nuclear program and tests, Pakistan would have been seeking to
delegitimize and isolate India in the Arab world. (There are reports that the Arab League
representative in New Delhi delivered a protest regarding the Indian ties with Israel).
Facing American isolation and sanctions after its own tests, Pakistan is looking to Iran
and the Arab states for support, particularly financial aid, and the attempt to tie India
and Israel into a single foreign non-Islamic force may be seen as useful in this process.
(In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab states successfully sold the claims of Israeli nuclear
cooperation with South Africa to many Europeans, Americans, Asians and Africans. After the
collapse of the apartheid regime, it became clear that this carefully managed
disinformation campaign was uncritically accepted, despite the absence of evidence.)
Regarding the reports of F-16s over Pakistan, if there were indeed such
aircraft, Pakistani officials may have known there identity, and that they were not
Israeli, but either to create a diversion just before their first test series, or to avoid
another confrontation with the US, it might have been convenient to attribute them to
Israel. This perhaps artificial crisis also highlighted the atmosphere and crisis and
tension which Pakistan deliberately generated to divert attention before its first nuclear
tests.
India, for its part, may also perceive an interest in linking itself to
Israel at this time. Although India's relations with Israel have been very limited and
India has traditionally aligned itself with the Arab states, this has been changing slowly
and there is some very limited conventional military cooperation, and there have been some
mutual visits. Isolated states tend to seek out each other's company and identify areas of
cooperation, and in this case, India may see some benefits in developing closer ties with
Israel in order to reduce the impact of Delhi's own isolation following the nuclear tests.
This may even lead some Indians to exaggerate such ties, precisely in order to help
counter the degree of isolation.
In addition, the Palestinians and many Arab states have an interest in
linking Israel to India and also to create or highlight allegations of Israeli
"plans" to attack Pakistan. For many years, Israeli policy makers have observed
the Egyptian led effort to use diplomatic pressure to "strip Israel of its deterrent
capability" and its technological superiority. This campaign to highlight the Israeli
nuclear status is also designed to delegitimate and isolate Israel internationally.13 The
false claims linking Israel to India are designed to tar Israel with the international
costs of testing even though Israel has not tested.14 In addition, by using the Indian and
Pakistani tests to highlight the Israeli nuclear option, Iran, Syria and perhaps other
states in the region are seeking to justify their own nuclear weapons ambitions and
efforts.
As noted above, Israel has a strong interest in keeping a low profile
with respect to these events, and has no interest in becoming involved in the
India/Pakistan/China triangle. Any rumors of involvement should be treated with a high
degree of skepticism, and to emphasize the point, in the Knesset, in response to questions
on this issue, the Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense declared that "Israel has
nothing to do with the tension on the Indian subcontinent. Israel does not regard either
India or Pakistan as an enemy, and all the reports to the contrary...have been
false."15 Indeed, the India tests that shattered the regime and triggered the
Pakistani tests are clearly not in Israel's interests.
5) Lessons
The nuclear arms race in South Asia did not end with the recent series
of tests by Indian and Pakistan. After the euphoria begins to wane, the Indian government
and public begin to understand that, at least with respect to Pakistan, the decision to
convert the deterrence relationship with Pakistan to one based on nuclear weapons was not
in India's national interests. In conventional weapons, India has a large lead over
Pakistan, and by expanding the competition to the nuclear realm, India has leveled the
playing field.
With its tested and acknowledged nuclear capability, Pakistan is now able to threat Indian
cities with massive retaliation, thereby reducing the significance of the Indian army's
conventional superiority. As Pakistan has proven its capability to detonate nuclear
weapons, India has become far more vulnerable to a direct attack or to accidental nuclear
warfare resulting from mutual fears of first strike and other sources of instability.
In addition, although India may enjoy a technical lead over Pakistan,
the government in Islamabad is likely to seek to close the gap by developing its own
advanced weapons. Thus, the South Asian region will be the site of a costly arms race,
with the expected development of more accurate weapons, second strike systems,
thermonuclear weapons, MIRVs, etc. Neither India nor Pakistan can afford these expensive
weapons systems, and the net result will be to reduce the pace of economic development,
leaving both countries even poorer and further behind the advanced industrial states.
(Recent public opinion polls have reflected a decline in the political support generated
by the nuclear tests in India.)
For the Middle East, these developments may provide a demonstration of
the high costs and lack of utility of nuclear weapons and the dangers of instability
associated with these deployments. If economic growth in India and Pakistan suffers as a
result of the investment in nuclear weapons and delivery systems, leading to political
unrest and undermining the support for the political elites, the message might be
understood in the Middle East. On the other hand, if the Indian strategy of using nuclear
weapons to gain international prestige and power succeeds, and India is rewarded with a
seat on the UN Security Council, this would encourage many states in the Middle East to
follow this route.
The effectiveness of economic sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan,
and the degree of international isolation faced by these states in the wake of their
nuclear tests, may also influence the impact on the Middle East. In any case, the only
significant sanctions that were imposed came from the U.S. (again demonstrating the
inability or unwillingness of Western Europe or Japan to use their economic power to
increase international stability, and the tendency of these states to rely on the U.S. to
act in terms of global interests.) Immediately after the tests, the U.S. did use its
powers, both bilaterally and multilaterally in such institutions as the World Bank and
IMF, to block loans and export credits to India. However, there are indications that the
level of U.S. commitment to sanctions is also limited. In July, the U.S. government waived
sanctions on Indian and Pakistani purchases of wheat and other basic agricultural items.
In the long term, it will be very difficult for the U.S., acting on its own, to maintain
the sanctions against states as important as India and Pakistan. If the economic costs are
limited and dissipate after 6 months or a year, other would-be nuclear powers, such as
Iran, might conclude that the costs of pursuing this path are minimal. This would have a
negative impact on efforts to block the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle
East.
6) The future of Israeli nuclear policy
As noted, the major impact on Israel results from the weakening of the
international non-proliferation regime, and the concern that the Iranian and Iraqi nuclear
ambitions and programs will be accelerated. Shortly after the tests, the Israeli
government noted that these events should lead "the international community ... to
make every effort in order to prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear capacity. The
international community needs to act decisively in order to prevent Iranian capabilities
in this sphere.16 This is and will remain Israel's primary goal, and until this situation
changes, Israel is extremely unlikely to change its policy or to follow the Indian and
Pakistani policies. Israeli officials also emphasize that Israel is a signatory to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, in contrast to India and
Pakistan, Israel has no interest in testing, but does have a strong interest in
maintaining the status quo with a strong non-proliferation regime. Successive Israeli
governments, representing different parties and ideologies, and in different military
conditions, have scrupulously honored the agreements from the late 1960s with the U.S.
government in which Israel pledged not to test or declare its nuclear status. For thirty
years, this policy of nuclear responsibility has been carefully maintained, despite the
NPT violations of Iraq and the Iranian programs.
Despite the suggestions in the Arab capitals, particularly from Cairo,
that somehow the Indian nuclear tests might be emulated by "other states that have
not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", the events in the South Asian
region will not change Israeli policy. Israel has nothing to gain and much to lose by
following India and becoming an overt nuclear power. The situations are very different, as
demonstrated in the fact that in contrast to India, Israel does not focus on the
discriminatory nature of the NPT, that allows some states to possess nuclear weapons,
Israel does not seek to become a world power, and has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. As a status-quo state facing Islamic and Arab-nationalist regimes that threaten
its survival, Israel's policy of last-resort deterrence based on deliberate nuclear
ambiguity continues to be the best option. Another area of contrast is
the realm of domestic politics. In India, the issue of nuclear status was a central
domestic political question that emphasized the Indian sense of discrimination and claims
for a seat among the major powers (including membership in the UN Security Council). One
important factor in the newly elected Indian government's decision to test was the
expectation that the national euphoria that would follow testing would enhance the support
for this narrow government. Indeed, shortly after the tests, public opinion polls showed
90% support for this decision. Similarly, after the Indian tests, domestic political
pressure in Pakistan forced the government's hand, and even if the decision makers were
reluctant to proceed with the nuclear tests, this pressure was essentially overwhelming.
In Israel, however, the vast majority of the public (as well as the
elite) support maintenance of the status quo, without testing, under existing conditions.
Nuclear status and policy does not play a role in Israeli domestic politics, and there is
also no "nuclear" lobby pressing for tests, as was the case among the Indian
technical and scientific elites.
Nevertheless, these events demonstrate that the ability of the
international community, in general, and the U.S., as the leader of this community, to
strengthen the non-proliferation regime and prevent Iran, Iraq, or Syria from obtaining
nuclear weapons is limited. During a meeting on nuclear proliferation at the Knesset
Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly noted that
Israel must assume that it will not be able to prevent Iran or Iraq from obtaining nuclear
capability. The nuclear tests in India and Pakistan altered the nuclear map in the world.
"Previously, the global system was built of five powers and three states on the verge
of gaining capability. After these tests, there are now seven nuclear powers and only one
state left on the verge of capability."17 As a result, in the longer term, Israel can
be expected to accelerate its own planning for a multipolar nuclear Middle East, including
secure second strike systems, active ballistic missile defense (including boost phase
intercept), and similar systems. The Indian and Pakistani tests have accelerated the
preparation for these future scenarios.
Prof. Gerald M. Steinberg is a Fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and
Director of the Center for Conflict Resolution in the Political Studies Department at Bar
Ilan University. He specializes in strategic issues and policies, and also heads arms
control research at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies.
NOTES:
1) Michael Eisenstadt, "Dual Bomb Blasts In South Asia: Implications For The Middle
East", Washington Institute for Near East Studies, May 1998
2) "Russia Exposes Attempts to Smuggle Dual Technologies Out", Itar-Tass July 15
1998; David Makovsky, Haaretz, 16 July 1998, p.1a
3) Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, BBC News (June 4, 1998), cited in "Middle
East Reverberations Of The Nuclear Tests In India And Pakistan", Policywatch #322 The
Washington Institute on Near East Policy, Washington DC, June 1998
4) Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in the Kuwaiti daily Al-Rai Al-Aam (May 31, 1998),
cited in "Middle East Reverberations of the Nuclear Tests In India and
Pakistan", Policywatch #322 The Washington Institute on Near East Policy, Washington
DC, June 1998
5) See, for example Herbert Krosney and Steven Weismann, The Islamic Bomb, and the BBC
Television documentary of the same name.
6) Pervez Hoodbbhoy, "Myth-Building: The Islamic Bomb", The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, June 1993, p. 42
7) Pakistan's Minister of Information, Mushahid Hussain in an interview with Der Spiegel
(June 8, 1998), cited in "Middle East Reverberations Of The Nuclear Tests In India
And Pakistan", Policywatch #322 The Washington Institute on Near East Policy,
Washington DC, June 1998
8) Eisenstadt, "Dual Bomb Blasts In South Asia: Implications for the Middle
East"
9) Pervez Hoodbbhoy, "Myth-Building: The Islamic Bomb", The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, June 1993, p. 45
10) Eisenstadt, "Dual Bomb Blasts In South Asia: Implications for the Middle
East"
11) Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Gohel Oyav Han, in an interview with Orly Azulai-Katz,
Yediot Ahronoth (June 19, 1998), cited in "Middle East Reverberations Of The Nuclear
Tests In India And Pakistan", Policywatch #322 The Washington Institute on Near East
Policy, Washington DC, June 1998
12) P. R. Kumaraswamy, The Strategic Partnership Between Israel And India, the BESA Center
for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, forthcoming (1998)
13) Gerald M. Steinberg, "The 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference and the
Arab-Israeli Peace Process", NonProliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, Fall 1996
14) See, for example, statements by Egyptian President Mubarak, quoted in "Egypt
Calls for World Treaty on Nuclear Disarmament", Xinhua 7 June 1998
15) Deputy Minister of Defense Silvan Shalom, Haaretz (June 4, 1998), cited in
"Middle East Reverberations Of The Nuclear Tests In India And Pakistan",
Policywatch #322 The Washington Institute on Near East Policy, Washington DC, June 1998
16) Prime Minister's Media Advisor Responds To Iran's Fm's Visit To Pakistan (Communicated
by the Prime Minister's Media Advisor) Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry -
Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 1 June 1998 17) Gideon Alon, "Nothing's certain when it comes
to the bomb", Ha'aretz, June 9, 1998
Prof. Gerald M. Steinberg
Tel:972-2-5634426 Political Studies
Off:972-3-5318043 (8578) Bar Ilan University
FAX:972-3-5353307 Ramat Gan, ISRAEL
email:gerald@vms.huji.ac.il
http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/index.shtml
To subscribe to publication list, send this to listserv@vm.biu.ac.il:
sub gerald-L user@address Your Name
Translate
this page automatically. 
|
