TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE BY
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL, JAVIER SOLANA
IN BRUSSELS ON MONDAY, 12 APRIL 1999
Good afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen,
Mesdames et Messieurs bonjour,
Nous venons de terminer une réunion très importante des Ministres des
Affaires étrangères alliés, que nous avons entièrement consacrée à l'examen
de la situation au Kosovo.
La crise du Kosovo constitue une étape décisive dans la définition de notre
vision d'une nouvelle Europe au sein de laquelle les droits de l'homme, les
valeurs démocratiques et l'état de droit prévaudront.
Aujourd'hui, nous avons évalué la situation au Kosovo et les progrès que
nous avons faits dans la conduite de l'opération "Force Alliée". Tous les
pays de l'OTAN ont exprimé leur indignation face au nettoyage ethnique
entrepris par les forces de sécurité yougoslaves au Kosovo et aux
expulsions forcées d'une grande partie de la population.
Nous avons rappelé notre détermination à mettre un terme à ces pratiques
barbares. Le dépeuplement systématique du Kosovo ne pourra perdurer. Le
nettoyage ethnique sera stoppé et la paix sera finalement rétablie au
Kosovo. Nos opérations aériennes se poursuivront aussi longtemps que
nécessaire, jusqu'à ce que nous ayons réussi à convaincre le Président
Milosevic d'accepter nos objectifs.
Let me briefly remind you of these objectives:
- the first: a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate
ending of violence and repression;
- the second: the withdrawal from Kosovo of the Yugoslav army, the
military, the police and the paramilitary forces;
- third: the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
- the fourth: the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and all the
displaced persons;
- the fifth: the credible assurance of Milosevic's willingness to work on
the basis of the Rambouillet Accords towards a political solution for
Kosovo in conformity with International Law and the Charter of the United
Nations.
Let me say that our air operations are taking a heavy toll of President
Milosevic's army and security forces. We are tightening the screw on those
forces in Kosovo which are responsible for repressing civilians. Our
operations are effective. They are being carried out according to the
moral and professional standards that you would expect from NATO. We have
lost no pilots and we have kept collateral damage to a minimum.
We have the political will and the resources to maintain our military
pressure until Milosevic backs down. But once again, I would like to
stress that NATO is not at war with Yugoslavia. Our quarrel is not with
the Yugoslav people but with a government and a military force that are
abusing their people in violation of all accepted norms of human rights.
I'd like to state also that the Allies, the Ministries, condemn the immoral
use of refugees by Belgrade as a means of destabilizing other countries in
the region. We are determined that this tactic shall not succeed - and it
has not succeeded.
As you know, we have held consultations with Albania and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We have assured these countries that we
will respond to any challenges by Yugoslavia to their security stemming
from the presence of NATO forces and their activities on their territories.
At the same time as you know we have mobilized our military resources to
assist the international humanitarian relief operations in the region.
NATO forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have constructed
emergency accommodation for refugees and have provided substantial care for
them. NATO troops as you know are also being deployed to Albania to
support the humanitarian efforts there and to assist the Albanian
authorities in providing a secure environment for them.
But as we deal with one humanitarian challenge, we are also aware that
there is another - dramatic - the one inside Kosovo itself. We are deeply
concerned at the fate of all the displaced people there in Kosovo who as
you know are facing hunger and exhaustion. This is another major
humanitarian crisis in the making and we are urgently considering whether
there are ways in which we might be able to help.
It is Milosevic who has caused this humanitarian crisis. He planned it and
started to carry it out well before NATO took the decision to act. However,
NATO has been in the forefront of international efforts to solve this
humanitarian crisis. NATO is not only trying to stop Milosevic's
brutality. We have also taken care of his victims. We will not forget
these inhumane acts. Milosevic and his commanders will be held
accountable for their actions.
Today we also expressed concern regarding once again the situation in
Montenegro. We have reaffirmed our support for President Djukanovic. And
I would like to stress again that any move against him and his government
will have grave consequences for President Milosevic.
Let me finally say that it is important that at this point we begin to look
beyond the crisis in Kosovo. The countries of the Former Yugoslavia and
their neighbours must be brought into the European mainstream.
They must be able to enjoy the same peace, the same security, the same
prosperity as the other countries of Europe.
The years of confrontation must come to an end in this part of Europe, in
southeastern Europe, or there will be no future for its peoples.
Today we confirmed that we will play a full part in a comprehensive
approach to stabilize this region. Such an approach which should address
the political, economic, security and humanitarian aspects must involve a
number of institutions but let me say that NATO will have its role to play.
There are as you know already several initiatives from the EU and also
from individual Allies. We will see how we can use the resources of our
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the model of the Partnership for
Peace to make NATO's contribution.
A democratic Yugoslavia - whose people have a normal relationship with
their neighbours in the Balkans - will have an important place in this vision.
So let me just finish by saying the message from this meeting today is
clear: Milosevic is losing and he knows he is losing.
NATO is united. We have justice and right on our side. We will prevail.
That is the message from the meeting today of all the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs from the Allied countries.
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
CHARLES (NBC):
Can I go back to the five preconditions for the end of the air strikes
which you spoke about and which are outlined in the communique and what
seems to me a subtle but significant difference in two of them to what
we've been hearing from yourself and other Alliance leaders up until now?
You said Milosevic must ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military
police and paramilitary forces. The word "all" is not used in there as it
has been in the past; and secondly, he must agree to the stationing in
Kosovo of an international military presence - the words "NATO-led" are
missing from that one.
Does this indicate a shifting of the ground on your position?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
No, no, no. The position is the same, the manner in which they have
formulated the five conditions is the same that has been repeatedly
reported by Ministers and Leaders of the Alliance for many weeks but they
should not be mistaken; the philosophy of the four points and in
particular the two you have mentioned are clear, troops may ???? and as
far as the second point that you have raised, I would like to say the NATO
countries, which without any doubt will be the most important contributors
to any force deployed in Kosovo, will not be prepared to be deployed with
any other scheme than the scheme in which they are prepared to work and
that is the scheme of NATO. The label may be something different but the
scheme really on the ground for the countries that would be the most
important contributors, no doubt about that, which are part of NATO, that
will not affect any other scheme of deployment, the channel of command is
structured and they know very well and it has worked well also in Bosnia.
Remember that in Bosnia the force which is employed now in Bosnia is
called SFOR, it doesn't have the NATO name but as you know very well, the
commanding structure whereby the majority of the countries deploy their
forces is a NATO structure.
JAMES ROBINS (BBC):
Secretary General, if I could follow up those points specifically, are you
saying to us that President Milosevic must still withdraw his entire
military police and paramilitary forces, there is no place for any of his
security forces to remain in Kosovo? And on the point you've just
touched on, can we assume from the wording about agreeing the stationing in
Kosovo of an international military presence, that it would be possible
that the NATO component of such a force would not necessarily be in the
majority and that NATO soldiers, as has happened occasionally in the past,
would find themselves under the command of other soldiers who were not from
the Alliance?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
OK. The points that I have mentioned, the five points, as you remember,
have also ??????? on the basis of the Rambouillet Accord. You remember
very well the content of the Rambouillet Accord about the withdrawal of
troops. We are going beyond that point because we think that if we want to
guarantee the return of refugees the situation on the ground must be such
that the refugees will have the guarantee, the security, that they can return.
I would like to underline very much, very strongly, that reversal of the
situation, the return of refugees is a basic commitment of the
international community.
The second thing that you mentioned about troops, I cannot imagine a
situation in which the NATO countries which are in theory and in practice
the countries that can deploy the most important contributions probably to
that force will be in a minority, I cannot imagine that. I can imagine a
situation like the SFOR in Bosnia in which at a point you will remember
more than 30 countries had forces deployed in Bosnia, I can imagine that
with countries that belong to the ??PC or to the PFPS scheme, countries
that belong to the European geographic context and other countries that may
be prepared to do it as we did in Bosnia but that is a scheme, don't
misinterpret what is said there. As I said before, the NATO countries
that will be without a doubt the most important contributors would like to
deploy their forces through the mechanism they have and the mechanism they
have is the command structure of NATO.
PATRICIA KELLY, CNN:
Secretary General, on your security guarantees for the surrounding country,
especially Albania which has allowed NATO to more or less take over its air
space, its ports, are those security guarantees NATO is offering the same
as NATO nations enjoy under article 5 first of all; and secondly, can
you be absolutely clear that if NATO troops go into Kosovo at any time,
there will be no dual-key command?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
On the first question, of course the security guarantee will be exactly the
same as the guarantee that the NATO countries do have but the difference
will be very slight. Any problem that those countries may have stemming
from the presence of NATO troops on the ground will be taken with the
utmost concern by the Alliance and therefore the response will be very
strong and very rapid but of course, they are not members of NATO and
article 5 would not apply to them but very close to that.
On the question about dual-key, I think the experiences we have had already
about this mechanism in the history of NATO in this new phase that goes to
1990/1995 and even before with the experience in Bosnia, do not suggest
that a sort of dual-key is an efficient manner of working but let me take
some time - a few days - before I answer in a more precise manner that
question. At this point, that is what I think and I think that is what the
countries that belong to the Alliance think with me.
CHRISTIAN UNTEANU, ROMANIA:
Vous avez parlé, M. le Secrétaire général, d'une approche compréhensive de
la situation des Balkans. Qu'est-ce que ça veut dire exactement, et quel
sera le rôle exact de l'OTAN dans ce nouveau type de situation ou de
solution politique?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
Je viens de dire que la préoccupation est pour la stabilité de la region,
c'est une priorité pour tous les pays de l'Alliance et pour tous les pays
de l'Europe, de l'Union. Comme vous savez, la reunion - la Conseil des
ministres de l'Union européenne - il y a quelques jours, il y a trois,
quatre jours, ont décidé de préparer un plan de stabilité pour la région.
Je crois que c'est une idée très, très positive, très créative, mais nous
pensons que l'OTAN peut aussi aider à ce processus. Il y a des composants
économiques, des composants de commerce, etc, mais il y a un composant
aussi de la sécurité, et je crois que l'OTAN peut contribuer d'une manière
très importante et façon très significative à travers des programmes que
nous avons : parténariat pour la paix, etc, parténariat pour .....force et
je crois que l'occasion....au Sommet à Washington qui aura lieu en quelques
jours il y aura une initiative probablement pour faire en sorte pour créer
un programme de stabilization du point de vue de sécurité dans la région,
c'est...............je crois que c'est très positive pour considérer une
programme sur la région qui va au delà de la crise aujourd'hui. Je crois
que nous aurons............siècle avec un programme créatif, important
.........économique, politique, commerce, etc., mais aussi du point de vue
de la sécurité.
QUESTION:
M. Solana, vous demandez à M. Milosevic de travailler et de....volonté de
travailler sur base de l'Accord de Rambouillet. Qu'est-ce qui'il faut
changer dans cet accord s'il faut changer quelque chose et est-ce qu'il
aura des nouvelles négotiations encore une fois à propos d'une solution
politique?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
Oui, l'accord de Rambouillet , c'est un accord signé par la partie Kosovar
mais après les événements des dernières semaines je crois que l'accord de
Rambouillet ne sera pas l'accord final, mais je crois que nous devons
utiliser - ou les negotiateurs devront utiliser - l'accord de Rambouillet
...le début ....négotiations ultérieures.
BILL DROZDIAK (WASHINGTON POST):
Mr. Secretary, given the kinds of atrocities and terrible things that have
happened in Kosovo, it seems almost unthinkable that the Kosovar Albanians
if and when they are allowed to return to their homes, would be able to
live or be willing to live in a Serbian state. From what you are saying
today, you are reaffirming that autonomy within Serbia still remains the
goal of the NATO Allies. If you are asking for the removal of all Serb
troops and forces, however, that seems to call into question Serbia's
sovereignty over Kosovo. How do you square that contradiction?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
I'd like to square that in the following manner: I think the most
important concern we should have at this moment is to guarantee the return
of refugees, that should be the most important commitment that the
international community should have at this point so the whole emphasis
should be placed on the possibility - not only the possibility - the
guarantee, the commitment -that it will be a reversal of the situation.
In order to achieve that, there is no question that from the very beginning
the forces will have to be withdrawn and the negotiators will have to work
out whatever is the scheme - and whether scheme will be NATO, the Contact
Group, I don't know what - but the scheme that is achieved at the end may
take some time to be achieved, to be terminated but in that period of time,
if we want to begin to reverse the situation and to allow the refugees to
return, two things have to take place - the withdrawal of the troops and
the implementation or the employment of an international troop that
guarantees the security of these people.
NICK MACKIE (DEUTSCHE WELLE):
Two clarifications please. Reading the statement regarding commandos and
regarding President Slobadan Milosevic himself, are you saying that you
will support any calls from the International Court to indict President
Slobadan Milosevic and his commanders as war criminals?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
This is an obvious question, it has an obvious reason, everybody has the
obligation to comply with the International Tribunal.
NICK MACKIE:
And the second clarification is on the word "permissive". There is a lot
of talk about when the environment is permissive then forces can be
deployed to help refugees return. Can you help us clarify the word
"permissive". Do you necessarily have to have a formal cease-fire in place
before troops can move in to help the return of refugees?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
Why don't you help me a little bit and don't ask me to qualify the word
"permissive"? I think you understand what I mean.
ANTOINE GUILLAU, TF1:
M. le Secretaire general est-ce que vous pouvez dire quel role vous voyez
pour la Russie dans cette resolution politique ou diplomatique de la crise,
que la Russie doit jour un role important et par ailleurs est-ce que l'OTAN
n'est pas en train de se transformer au fil des jours en force humanitaire
egalement.
SECRETARY GENERAL:
Une partie de votre question implique bien la Russie. La rôle de la Russie
à notre avis sera très important. Nous croyons - pas seulement moi-même -
mais nous croyons que la rôle de la Russie doit être important. Comme vous
savez demain Secrétaire Albright rencontrera à Oslo avec Ministre Ivanov.
Ca sera suivi par d'autres rencontres avec des ministres de l'Alliance et
je crois que ça sera possible dans quelques jours une reunion des ministres
des affaires étrangères des G8 aura lieu donc pour incorporer la Russie à
la solution du conflit. Tous les Alliés sont déterminés à faire tous les
efforts pour avoir la Russie avec nous, mais cela dépendera de nous et
aussi dépendera tout à fait de la Russie.
L'OTAN a accepté d'avoir des missions nouvelles, qui ont beaucoup de
vecteurs, de composants...la composants d'établir la sécurité, la stabilité
de la région, c'est tout à fait important et tout d'abord le premier, mais
ensuite si'il y a des.... humanitaires, nous serons aussi prêt à aider,
comme nous sommes en train de faire ici à Macédoine et aussi en Albanie,
mais avant aussi en Bosnie. Ca ne sera pas la première fois que nous avons
des engagements de caractère humanitaires, nous avons déjà fait en Bosnie
et des autres occasions. L'OTAN est prêt dans la dimension, dans les
limitations que nous avons à aider, mais c'est vrai qu'il y a des
organisations plus prêt pour aider la question humanitaire - les nations
unies etc.
CHRISTOPHER:
Mr. Secretary General, when you say that you support the return of the
refugees to Kosovo, do you mean the return of the refugees immediately to
their home towns in Kosovo or do you mean just back across the line into
Kosovo territory? For instance, would you mean that immediately the
people from Podujevo, north of Pristina, should be allowed to go back to
Podujevo as an example?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
They should be allowed to return to their homes but the international
community has to make an effort, an important effort, to rebuild the houses
and in the example you have given probably nobody will be able to return to
that particular house because it has been destroyed so NATO and the
international community have to put forward a programme so that these
people can go to their homes and find a house or have to construct a house
but the first and most important thing is they can return to their country.
CHRISTOPHER:
And to their home villages? I have the feeling that it will take time.
SECRETARY GENERAL:
Sure, it will take time, no question about that.
CHRISTOPHER:
We are not talking about a situation where they would go into, say, an
enclave in Kosovo and maybe some day in the future return?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
No, no. Although, as you have said very intelligently, it may take time
because the recuperation and the construction of the houses and all the
towns will take time, this is the commitment that the international
community has taken. That will not be the responsibility of NATO alone,
it will also be the responsibility of some other institutions, of a scheme
of the UN or World Bank etc. We will need probably immediately a donors'
(?) conference to obtain the necessary forces so that a change in Kosovo
from the humanitarian point of view and from the economic point of view can
take place but this would not be a responsibility of NATO.
CHRISTOPHER:
But it would be all of Kosovo?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
That is our wish, that everybody who wants to return could return. We
cannot accept a change by force, of what de facto is a change of border by
force.
DOMINIQUE THIERRY, RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE:
Une clarification, M. le Secrétaire général, sur la force internationale
qui assurerait la sécurité pour le retour des refugiés au Kosovo, n'y est
il pas un changement à cette force et pourra-t-elle intervenir avant la
signature d'un accord politique et est-ce qu'un mandat de l'ONU sera
nécessaire?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
A ce moment je ne peux pas répondre de manière précise à votre question.
Je crois que ça sera nécessaire de déployer les troupes dès que possible
pour faire ...pour commencer le retour des refugiés et la manière plus
rapide que possible mais être plus précis à ce moment ça sera
difficile....voir comment les choses se deroulent sur le terrain et des
points de vue politiques aussi mais la disposition d'esprit c'est de le
faire de la manière le plus rapide. Le mandat sera je ne sais pas si ca
sera le mandat de l'ONU, vous savez il y a beaucoup de pays qui ........le
mandat de l'ONU pour fermer les cadres de tous les processus de paix au
Kosovo, c'est une question nouvelle, mais ....je crois que M. Annan a fait
une déclaration très positive.......................que les différents pays
de l'OTAN, je crois que c'est une signal très positive de la volonté des
nations unies de faire un effort pour aider avec nous de résoudre le problème.
CARLOS:
Secretary General, if Mr. Milosevic does meet the five conditions, do you
think he could be able to remain in power or do you think he soon leave
anyway?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
It is not for me to answer that question. There are other institutions
and in particular the people of Serbia have to answer that question.
PAVEL BOUDA, CZECH TV:
Secretary General, we are now three weeks almost into the air campaign. Do
you think that the prospects for a settlement of the Kosovo crisis are
today better than three weeks ago when the operation Allied Force" started?
SECRETARY GENERAL:
The question, if I understand it properly, was if we are today closer to
solving profoundly the crisis in Kosovo than three weeks ago. The answer
is yes, to solve profoundly the crisis in Kosovo, not superficially,
profoundly, yes.